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SECTION 1981 AND EMPLOYMENT TESTING:
DISCRIMINATORY IMPACT ESTABLISHES A
PRIMA FACIE CASE
When a member of a racial minority group is denied a job because
of a racially discriminatory employment qualification test,I he may
sue the employer under section 1981 of the Civil Rights Act of 1870,2
the Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause,3 or Title VII of
1. An employment qualification test is said to be racially discriminatory when a
significantly larger proportion of blacks or other racial minorities fail it than whites. 3
A. LARSON, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION § 74.10 (1977). See, e.g., Bridgeport
Guard., Inc. v. Members of Bridgeport Civ. Serv. Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333, 1335 (2d
Cir. 1973) a f'dper curiam, 497 F.2d 1113 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991
(1975) (passing rate for whites on civil service examination was 3 1/2 times the black
passing rate); Castro v. Beecher, 459 F.2d 725, 729 (1st Cir. 1972) prob. jurls, noted,
365 F. Supp. 655 (D. Mass. 1973) (passing rate of 65% for whites, 25% for blacks on
police department entrance examination); Chance v. Board of Examiners, 458 F.2d
1167, 1171 (2d Cir. 1972), amended on other gpounds, 496 F.2d 820 (2d Cir. 1974)
(passing rate for whites was 1 1/2 times that for blacks in examination for supervisory
positions in New York City school system).
The qualification tests most commonly used by employers are: general intelligence
tests, tests of specific intellectual abilities, knowledge and skill tests, measures of dex-
terity and coordination, and inventories of personality traits. 2 PERSONNEL TESTING
AND EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY (B. Anderson & M. Rogers eds. 1970).
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976) (originally enacted as part of the Civil Rights Act of
1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27, re-enacted in the Civil Rights Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 16,
16 Stat. 144).
42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976) provides:
All persons within the jurisdiction of the United States shall have the same right
in every State and Territory to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties,
give evidence, and to the full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for
the security of persons and property as is enjoyed by white citizens, and shall be
subject to like punishment, pains, penalties, taxes, licenses, and exactions of
every kind, and to no other.
"Relief under § 1981 is limited to correcting racial discrimination." Patterson v.
American Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257, 270 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920
(1976), modffed on other grounds, 586 F.2d 300 (4th Cir. 1978). The courts, however,
have not limited § 1981 to the technical or restrictive meaning of "race." Manzanares
v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 593 F.2d 968 (10th Cir. 1979) (§ 1981 applies to discrimina-
tion against Mexican-Americans).
3. U.S. CONST. Amend. XIV, § 1 provides in part that "[n]o State shall. . . deny
to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." The Four-
teenth Amendment is only applicable where some form of state action exists. See,
e.g., Shelly v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948). (Judicial enforcement of a private
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the Civil Rights Act of 1964.4 The proof necessary to establish a
prima facie case of racial discrimination differs according to the stat-
utory or constitutional provision under which the aggrieved employ-
ment applicant sues.5 Federal courts have yet to clearly determine
the standard of proof required for a minority plaintiff to establish a
prima facie case in a section 1981 suit.6 In Davis v. County of Los
Angeles,7 the Ninth Circuit held that plaintiffs established their sec-
tion 1981 prima facie case merely by presenting statistical evidence of
the qualification test's discriminatory impact.' Since section 1981 ap-
plies to situations not covered by Title VII or the Fourteenth Amend-
ment,' the proof required by federal courts in a section 1981 suit will
agreement that excludes blacks from use or occupancy of real estate for residential
purposes is a state action within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment and is
contrary to the equal protection clause of that Amendment); Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3, 11-19 (1883).
4. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976).
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual, or otherwise to dis-
criminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, condi-
tions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color,
religion, sex or national origin.
Id. at § 2000e-2(a)(l).
5. Soon after the enactment of Title VII many lower courts assumed Title VII
replaced § 1981. See Note, Desegregation of Private Schools: Is Section 1981 the An-
swer.' 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1147, 1159-61 (1973). It is now clear, however, that Title
VII was designed to supplement, not supplant § 1981. See Alexander v. Gardner-
Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48-49 (1974). See also 118 CONG. REc. 3371 (1972) (state-
ment of Sen. Williams).
6 See notes 39-42 and accompanying text infra.
7 566 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1977), vacated as moot, 440 U.S. 625 (1979). By a five-
to-four decision the Supreme Court held that because plaintiffs' claim had become
moot, a decision on the merits was not required. In a dissenting opinion, Justice
Powell stated: "We should reach, rather than seek a questionable means of avoiding,
the important question-heretofore unresolved by this court-whether cases brought
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, like those brought directly under the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, require proof of racially discriminatory intent or purpose." Id. at 637 (Powell,
J., dissenting).
Justice Powell also noted that although a decision vacating a judgment necessarily
prevents the lower court opinion from being the law of the case, the opinion of the
court of appeals on the merits is likely to be viewed as persuasive authority in the
Ninth Circuit. Id. at 646 n.10 (Powell, J., dissenting).
8. 566 F.2d at 1334.
9. A comparison of the scope of § 1981 to Title VII indicates that while each
statute was designed to prevent racial discrimination by both public and private em-
ployers. Title VII is less accessible as a remedy because of its many administrative
requirements and the exemption of several private employers from its coverage. See
1980]
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol19/iss1/13
URBAN LAW ANNUAL
largely determine the success of suits challenging racially discrimina-
tory qualification tests. 10
In Davis v. County of Los Angeles, plaintiffs, black and Mexican-
generally Comment, Private Discrimination Under the 1866 Civil Rights Act: In Search
of Principled Constitutional and Policy Limits, 7 TOL. L. REV. 139 (1975). Title VII is
limited to employers in interstate commerce with 15 or more employees. 42 U.S.C.
§ 2000e(b) (1976). Cf. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975)
(a person aggrieved under § 1981 may bring suit immediately). Olson v. Rembrandt
Printing Co., 511 F.2d 1228 (8th Cir. 1975) (Title VII suit must be preceded by a
resort to administrative procedures). See also, Kaemmerer, Jurisdictional Prerequi-
sites to Private Actions Under Title VII ofthe Civil Rights Act of 1964, 41 Mo. L. REV.
215 (1976) (lists all required procedural steps under Title VII).
Title VII contains its own limitations period. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(l) (1976) (re-
quires an initial complaint be filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Com-
mission (EEOC) within 180 days after the alleged act of discrimination and permits
suit to be filed within 90 days after the EEOC exhausts it administrative procedures).
The applicable state statute of limitations is used in a suit under § 1981. 421 U.S. 454
(1975). See generally 42 Mo. L. REV. 100 (1977).
Unlike § 1981, Title VII exempts from coverage bona fide tax exempt private mem-
bership clubs. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(b)(2) (1976). However, Title VII is the exclusive
individual remedy available to a federal employment applicant. Brown v. General
Serv. Adm'n, 425 U.S. 820, 824-25 (1976).
The primary difference in scope between § 1981 and the Fourteenth Amendment is
the latter's requirement of state action. See note 3 supra. Section 1981 applies to
discrimination in private employment. Johnson v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 421
U.S. 454 (1975).
10. Section 1981 was not used as a remedy against racially discriminatory em-
ployment practices for nearly a century after its enactment. See Note, 7he Expanding
Scope of Section 1981: Assault on Private Discrimination and a Cloud on Affirnative
Action, 90 HARV. L. REV. 412 (1976). The Supreme Court ruled that Congress was
only empowered by the Thirteenth Amendment to proscribe slavery. Hodges v.
United States, 201 U.S. 1 (1906). See also Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
Because § 1981 was enacted under the authority of the Thirteenth Amendment and
prohibited actions other than slavery, courts held it to be ineffective. Id. at 18.
It was not until 1968 that the Supreme Court finally decided in a series of four cases
that § 1981 prohibits racially discriminatory employment practices, both public and
private. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), first upheld the use of 42
U.S.C. § 1982 (1970), a companion statute of § 1981, as a valid exercise of Congress'
powers under the Thirteenth Amendment to prohibit both public and private racial
discrimination in the sale and rental of property. In Sullivan v. Little Hunting Park,
396 U.S. 229 (1969), the Court applied § 1982 to prohibit racial discrimination in a
neighborhood recreational facility. Tillman v. Wheaton-Haven Recreation Ass'n, 410
U.S. 431 (1973), used §§ 1981 and 1982 to require a swimming pool membership club
to admit blacks living in the area. Finally, in Johnson v. Railway Express Agency,
Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975), the Supreme Court held that § 1981 affords a federal rem-
edy against racial discrimination in employment by either state or private action. See
generally Larson, The Development oSection 1981 as a Remedyfor Racial Discrimina-
tion in Private Employment, 7 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 56 (1972); 10 U. RiCH. L.
REV. 339 (1976).
[Vol. 19:268
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American" applicants for positions as firemen, alleged that defend-
ant employers' 2 were guilty of racial discrimination in their use of
written examinations' 3 to rank applicants.' 4 Although there was no
dispute that these examinations had a discriminatory impact on mi-
nority job applicants,' 5 plaintiffs were unable to prove defendants
had a discriminatory intent in their use of the qualification examina-
11. For a discussion of the application of § 1981 to Mexican-Americans, see
Greenfield & Kates, Mexican-Americans, Racial Discrimination, and the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 662 (1975).
12. Defendants were Los Angeles County, the County Board of Supervisors and
the County Civil Service Commission. 566 F.2d at 1336.
13. For an explanation of the standards developed for determining whether a
written examination is sufficiently job-related to rebut a challenge in a Title VII suit,
see Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Guidelines on Employee
Selection Procedures, 29 C.F.R. § 160 (1979). See generally Johnson, Albemarle Paper
Company v. Moodv: The Aftermath of Griggs and the Death of Employee Testing, 27
HASTINGS L.J. 1239 (1976); 37 LA. L. REV. 973 (1977).
14. 566 F.2d at 1337. Suit was originally filed under the Fourteenth Amendment,
42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983 and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 566 F.2d at
1336. The Decision, however, was based solely on § 1981. Id. at 1341.
Section 1983 was not applied here because at the time of the decision a municipal-
ity was not a "person" who could be sued under § 1983. Id. See City of Kenosha v.
Bruno. 412 U.S. 507, 511-13 (1973); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187-92 (1961).
After Davis r. County of/Los Angeles, the Supreme Court overruled Monroe. Monell
v. Department of Social Serv. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 701 (1978).
Monell held that local governing bodies could be sued directly under § 1983 where
plaintiff alleges an unconstitutional action that implements or executes a policy offi-
cially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers. Id. at 690. However, Monell
could not have helped these plaintiffs because they were unable to show the discrimi-
natory intent necessary to prove a constitutional violation. See Washington v. Davis,
426 U.S. 229 (1976).
Title VII was not applicable because the parties stipulated that defendants aban-
doned use of the written examinations before March 24, 1972, the date Title VII first
became applicable to state public employers. 566 F.2d at 1347 n.2 (Wallace, J., dis-
senting).
The court did not use the Fourteenth Amendment as the basis for its decision be-
cause there was no showing that defendants administered the challenged examination
with any intent or purpose to discriminate against minority applicants. Id . at 1338.
See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (discriminatory intent must be shown
in order to establish a prmafacie case of unconstitutional employment discrimination
violative of the Fourteenth Amendment).
15. Despite a minority population of 29.1% in Los Angeles County, only 3.3% of
the firemen employed by defendants at the time of trial were black or Mexican-Amer-
ican Defendants interviewed the top 544 scorers on the challenged written qualifica-
tion tests. While 25.8% of the white applicants were among the top 544 scorers on the
test, only 5.1% of the black applicants were among the top scorers. 566 F.2d at 1337.
1980]
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tions.1
6
The trial court concluded that statistical evidence of discriminatory
impact alone established a prima facie case under section 1981.17 On
appeal the Ninth Circuit rejected defendants' contention that in a
section 1981 action discriminatory intent also must be proven to es-
tablish a prima facie case, 8 as required in a suit brought under the
Fourteenth Amendment. 9 The court held that, without an express
contrary pronouncement from the Supreme Court, there remains no
operational distinction between liability based upon Title VII and
section 1981 in determining whether plaintiffs have established a
prima facie case of racial discrimination.2"
Any job applicant who alleges the use of racially discriminatory
employment tests has a federal cause of action against state, federal,
and private employers under Title VII.2 ' The Fourteenth Amend-
ment provides a federal cause of action only against a state and its
political subdivisions.22
16. Id. at 1338.
17. Id. at 1337.
18. Id. at 1338-39.
19. See note 37 and accompanying text infra.
20. 566 F.2d at 1340. Section 1981 is limited to racial discrimination suits. See
note 2 supra. Title VII covers discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex,
and national origin. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 44 (1974).
The court also faced two other issues. Under Title VII, plaintiffs challenged de-
fendant's use of a 5'7"-height requirement that effectively excluded 41% of the other-
wise eligible Mexican-American applicants. The court, noting that no scientifically
approved test had been used to determine whether the height requirement was job-
related, held the height requirement invalid. 566 F.2d at 1341-42. See Dothard v.
Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 267 (1977) (Title VII prohibits the use of height requirements
which have a discriminatory effect unless an employer can show that this requirement
is job-related).
Another issue decided by the court was whether affirmative § 1981 relief should
have been granted to remedy the effects of past discrimination. The majority stated
that because affirmative relief has been ordered frequently for violations of Title VII,
the court has equal power under § 1981 to order affirmative relief. 566 F.2d at 1342.
See United States v. Ironworkers Local 86, 443 F.2d 544, 553 (9th Cir. 1971), cert,
denied, 404 U.S. 984 (1971) (affirmative relief available where a Title VII violation is
found). But see Chance v. Board of Examiners, 534 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 431 U.S. 965 (1977) (affirmative relief not warranted under § 1981 or Title
VII); Kirkland v. New York State Dep't of Correct. Serv., 520 F.2d 420 (2d Cir. 1975),
cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976) (imposition of affirmative relief unwarranted).
21. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1976). Employers in private industry who
employ fewer than 15 persons and bona fide private membership clubs are exempted.
Id. § 2000e(b).
22. See note 3 supra. A federal cause of action against the District of Columbia is
[Vol. 19:268
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The Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.23 determined the
standard for establishing a prima facie case in a Title VII employ-
ment discrimination suit.24 Thirteen black employees challenged
under Title VII the requirement that applicants have a high school
diploma or pass an intelligence test as a prerequisite to employment
at defendant's plant." The Court held that plaintiffs had established
a prima facie case by producing statistical evidence showing the qual-
ification tests had a racially discriminatory impact.26 The Griggs
court did not require evidence of the employer's discriminatory in-
tent.
27
Lower federal courts extended the Griggs holding to suits brought
under the Fourteenth Amendment and section 1981.28 In Chicano
provided by the Fifth Amendment due process clause. U.S. CONST., Amend V. See
Washington v. Davis. 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976). Title VII is the exclusive individual
remedy available to a federal employment applicant. Brown v. General Serv. Adm'n,
425 U.S. 820, 824-25 (1976).
23. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
24. Before Griggs a conflict existed among the lower courts as to whether Title VII
required a plaintiff to prove an employer's discriminatory intent. See Parham v.
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 433 F.2d 421 (8th Cir. 1970) (Title VII requires proof of
intent to discriminate); Local 189, United Papermakers & Paperworkers v. United
States, 416 F.2d 980 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 919 (1970) (proof of dis-
criminatory intent not required).
25 401 U.S. at 425-26.
26 Id. at 431-32. Many cases have held that statistics alone may prove a prima
facie case of employment discrimination under Title VII. See, e.g., General Elec. Co.
v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 136-37 (1976) (dicta); Rule v. Local 396, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge,
Structural and Orn'l Ironworkers, 568 F.2d 558, 566 (8th Cir. 1977) (statistics may be
used to prove discrimination in apprenticeship program); James v. Stockham Valves
& Fittings Co., 559 F.2d 310, 328 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1034 (1978)
(evidence that 70% of all black workers were assigned to highly repetitive jobs as
compared with only 31.7% of white employees, in a formerly segregated plant, ade-
quate to establish prima facie case).
27. 401 U.S. at 43. Although a plaintiff has made a showing of discriminatory
impact, to obtain individual relief he must also prove that:
(i) he belongs to a racial minority:
(n1) he applied and was qualified for a job for which the employer was seeking
applicants;
(iii) despite his qualifications, he was rejected, and
(iv) after his rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued
to seek applicants from persons of complainant's qualifications.
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). See generall, Note, Em-
ployment Testing. The Aftermath of Griggs v. Duke Power Company, 72 COLUM. L.
REV, 900 (1972).
28. For decisions applying the Griggs standard to employment discrimination
suits brought under the Fourteenth Amendment, see Douglas v. Hampton, 512 F.2d
1980)
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Police Officer's Ass'n v. Stover,29 plaintiffs3" alleged under section
1981 that defendants3' used qualification tests that had the effect of
excluding a disproportionate number of Chicanos from employment
and promotions in the police department.32 Holding the plaintiffs
were only required to show that the challenged procedures had a dis-
criminatory impact, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals stated the
measure of a prima facie case in a section 1981 action is the same as
in a suit brought under Title VII.33
The Supreme Court later limited Griggs by indicating that the
Griggs standard34 does not apply to all employment discrimination
suits brought under provisions other than Title VII. In Washington v.
Davis,3 5 plaintiffs contended that defendants' use of a written person-
nel test violated their Fourteenth Amendment rights solely because
the test was shown to have a racially discriminatory impact.36 The
976 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (Griggs standard used in Fourteenth Amendment challenge to
employment entrance examination); Bridgeport Guardians, Inc. v. Civil Serv.
Comm'n, 482 F.2d 1333 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 991 (1973) (evidence of
discriminatory impact in policemen's written examination establishes prima facie
case).
For decisions applying the Griggs standard to § 1981 suits, see Patterson v. Ameri-
can Tobacco Co., 535 F.2d 257 (4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 920 (1976),
modifled on other grounds, 586 F.2d 300 (1978) (Griggs standard equally applicable to
Title VII and § 1981); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harv. Co., 502 F.2d
1309 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 997 (1976) (Griggs standard should be used
in § 1981 suits to avoid undesirable substantive law conflicts); Carter v. Gallagher,
452 F.2d 315 (8th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972) (statistical evidence
adequate to make a prima facie case).
29. 526 F.2d 431 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, vacated and remanded, 426 U.S.
944 (1976).
30. Plaintiffs were 12 Chicano employees of the Albuquerque, New Mexico Police
Department and the Chicano Police Officer's Association. 526 F.2d at 433.
31. Defendants were the Chief of Police, the City Commissioners and the City
Manager of Albuquerque. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 438.
34. See notes 23-27 and accompanying text supra.
35. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
36. The Fourteenth Amendment equal protection clause is not applicable because
Washington v. Davis involves the District of Columbia. The Fourteenth Amendment
only applies to the states and their political subdivisions. The Fifth Amendment due
process clause, however, contains an equal protection component that prohibits the
federal government from discriminating against any person on the grounds of race,
color, religion or national origin. Id. at 239. See Boling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
(1954).
Plaintiffs originally brought suit under the Fifth Amendment, § 1981, and D.C.
[Vol. 19:268
Washington University Open Scholarship
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
Supreme Court held that evidence of discriminatory impact, al-
though relevant, was not enough to establish a prima facie case under
the Fourteenth Amendment.37 Plaintiffs were required to prove that
defendants had a discriminatory intent in their use of the personnel
test.38
Since Washington v. Davis, only a few federal courts have consid-
ered whether a plaintiff under section 1981 needs to prove discrimi-
natory intent. In Croker v. Boeing Co. (Vertol Division),39 for
example, the court noted that Washington v. Davis had not explicitly
held proof of intentional discrimination a necessary component of a
section 1981 claim.4 The Croker court mentioned, however, the sim-
ilarities between section 1981 and the Fourteenth Amendment,4' and
held that the Fourteenth Amendment requirement of proof of dis-
criminatory intent must be met in order to establish a prima facie
case under section 1981.42
CODE § 1-320 (1973). During the trial they filed a motion for partial summary judg-
ment solely on Fifth Amendment grounds, raising no issue under § 1981. 426 U.S. at
234.
37. Id. at 242.
38 Id. at 238-39. Since Washington, the Court has elaborated on the factors that
may be examined to find circumstantial or direct evidence of discriminatory intent in
official actions. Relevant factors include the historical background of the challenged
action, the specific sequence of events leading up to the action, departures from the
normal procedural sequence, and substantive departures in decision making where
factors usually considered important strongly favor a contrary decision. Village of
Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev, Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977). Seegener-
ally Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977) (discriminatory intent proved by a
showing that Mexican-Americans constituted only 39% of those called for grand jury
duty dunng an Il-year period in a county with a 79% Mexican-American popula-
tion); 37 LA. L. REv. 973 (1977).
39 437 F. Supp. 1138 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
40. Id. at 1181. Accord Davis v. County of Los Angeles, 566 F.2d 1334, 1339-40
(9th Cir. 1977); vacated as moot, 440 U.S. 625 (1979); id. at 1347 (Wallace, J., dissent-
ing).
41. The court stated that § 1981 and the Fourteenth Amendment were passed at
about the same time to deal with the problems of blacks after the Civil War. Also, the
language of § 1981 was said to parallel the Fourteenth Amendment. 437 F. Supp. at
1181. For a comparison of the language of § 1981 and the Fourteenth Amendment,
see notes 50-51 and accompanying text infra.
42. 437 F, Supp. at 1181. Since the Supreme Court decision in Washington v.
Davis, lower federal courts have been divided as to whether a plaintiff in a § 1981 suit
needs to prove defendant's discriminatory intent. Many of these cases, however, fail
to show the reasoning behind the court's conclusion.
Cases indicating that a showing of racially discriminatory impact is adequate in-
clude Kinsey v. First Reg'l. Sec,, Inc., 557 F.2d 830, 838 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (court
19801
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In Davis v. County of Los Angeles,43 the Ninth Circuit faced a clear
choice-either to follow the pre- Washington v. Davis decisions 44 and
require only a showing of discriminatory impact, or to continue the
post- Washington trend45 requiring proof of discriminatory intent.
The court decided it was free to follow the pre- Washington decisions
because Washington did not address the question of whether section
1981 requires a showing of discriminatory intent.46 The majority rea-
soned that since both Title VII and section 1981 apply to employment
discrimination cases, 47 and since the available remedies are "parallel
or overlapping,, 41 the Griggs discriminatory impact standard should
stated in dictum, and without analysis, that a plaintiff proceeding under § 1981 need
not meet the Washington v. Davis constitutional standard); Dawson v. Pastrick, 441 F.
Supp. 133, 140-41 (N.D. Ind. 1977) (cited several pre- Washington v. Davis cases, hold-
ing that statistical evidence is adequate in a § 1981 suit); Neely v. City of Grenada,
438 F. Supp. 390, 406 (N.D. Miss. 1977) (standards for determining whether a prima
facie case is made are virtually identical for § 1981 and for Title VII); Winston v.
Smithsonian Science Info. Exch., 437 F. Supp. 456, 473 (D.D.C. 1977), afrd menh.,
595 F.2d 888 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (in fashioning a substantive body of law under § 1981
the courts should look to Title VII principles to avoid undesirable substantive law
conflicts); Woods v. City of Saginaw, Michigan, 13 Empl. Prac. Dec. 11,299 (E.D.
Mich. 1976) (no analysis given).
Cases holding that plaintiff must prove intentional discrimination under § 1981 in-
clude Williams v. DeKalb County, 582 F.2d 2,2-3 (5th Cir. 1978), modifying 577 F.2d
248 (5th Cir. 1978) (held that Washington Y. Davis requires application of a constitu-
tional standard to a § 1981 claim); Harkless v. Sweeney Indep. School Dist., 554 F.2d
1353, 1357-58 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 966 (court assumed, without dis-
cussion, that § 1981 requires proof of discriminatory intent, and held plaintiff showed
discriminatory intent); Chicano Police Officer's Ass'n v. Stover, 552 F.2d 918 (10th
Cir. 1977); City of Milwaukee v. Saxbe, 546 F.2d 693, 705 (7th Cir. 1976) (without
analysis court held that where no Fifth Amendment claim proved, no § 1981 claim
had been made out either); Arnold v. Ballard, 448 F. Supp. 1025, 1028 (N.D. Ohio
1978) (legislative history of § 1981, prior Supreme Court opinions dealing with the
Civil Rights Act of 1866 and Washington v. Davis can be harmonized only by holding
that proof of discriminatory intent is required for § 1981 claims); Lewis v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 440 F. Supp. 949, 965 (D. Md. 1977); Johnson v. Hoffman, 424 F. Supp.
490, 494 (E.D. Mo. 1977), afld sub nom. Johnson v. Alexander, 572 F.2d 1219, 1223
(8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 986 (1978) (since § 1981 is derived in part from
the Fourteenth Amendment, similar standards should apply).
43. 566 F.2d 1334 (9th Cir. 1977), vacated as moot, 440 U.S. 625 (1979).
44. See notes 28-33 and accompanying text supra.
45. See notes 38-42 and accompanying text supra.
46. 566 F.2d at 1340. Although the dissent did not agree with the majority's over-
all conclusion, it did concede that Washington v. Davis did not consider which stan-
dard should govern § 1981. Id. at 1350 n.10 (Wallace, J., dissenting).
47. See note 9 supra.
48. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 & n.7 (1973). The
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apply to both statutes.49
The court's analysis, however, fails to examine the similar lan-
guage of section 1981 and the Fourteenth Amendment. As several
post- Washington v. Davis opinions indicate,5" the similarities in lan-
guage present a forceful argument for using the same standard of
proof for both provisions. The broad language of section 1981, that
"[a]ll persons. . shall have the right. . . to the full and equal bene-
fits of all . . . laws . . ."'I is clearly parallel to the Fourteenth
Amendment's statement that "[n]o State shall. . . deny to any per-
son . . . the equal protection of the laws."5"
The justifications given by the Washington v. Davis Court for re-
quiring discriminatory intent in Fourteenth Amendment suits may
also apply to section 1981 suits.53 The possibility that using the dis-
criminatory impact standard would validate governmental decisions
susceptible to judicial invalidation troubled the Court in Washington
v. Davis.54 The Court also was concerned about limiting the judici-
ary's role in the drive for racial equality. Since section 1981 could
Supreme Court used the terms "parallel or overlapping" to mean that Title VII reme-
dies are designed to supplement, not supplant, other applicable statutes. Id. at 48.
49. 566 F.2d at 1340. The assertion that both Title VII and § 1981 apply to the
same fact situations and provide similar remedies is not a persuasive reason for apply-
ing the same standard to both statutes. As the dissent in Davis v. County ofLos Ange-
les points out, a similar statement can be made about Title VII and the Fourteenth
Amendment. Yet Washington v. Davis indicates that the same standard does not ap-
ply to suits brought under these provisions. Id. at 1348.
50. Lewis v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 440 F. Supp. 949, 965 (D. Md. 1977) (§ 1981
and the Fourteenth Amendment contain parallel language); Johnson v. Hoffman, 424
F. Supp. 490, 494 (E.D. Mo. 1977), affd sub nom. Johnson v. Alexander, 572 F.2d
1219 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 986 (1978) (§ 1981 is designed to provide
equal protection under the law).
51. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976).
52. U.S. CONST., Amend. XIV, § 1.
The language of Title VII, however, does not parallel either § 1981 or the Four-
teenth Amendment. Title VII is a complex statute that specifically identifies pro-
scribed conduct and exempts some activities from its coverage. See note 9 supra, 42
Mo. L. REV. 100 (1977).
53. See Lang, Towarda Right to Union Membershi, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv.
31, 56 (1977).
54. The Washington v. Davis Court was concerned that any governmental deci-
sion possibly could be subject to judicial review at any time if it happened to place a
greater burden on one group than on another. Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229,
248 (1976).
55. The Court indicated that the Congress and the President should decide what
specific types of discriminatory employment practices should be proscribed. Id.
19801
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be applied in every Fourteenth Amendment claim of racially dis-
criminatory employment practices, these same concerns should exist
in a section 1981 suit.56
Davis v. County of Los Angeles could severely limit the harsh im-
pact of Washington v. Davis5 7 by allowing a plaintiff to avoid the
Fourteenth Amendment intent requirement when committing a sec-
tion 1981 violation.58 The court provides members of racial minority
groups who are unable to obtain a Title VII remedy a realistic chance
of obtaining relief.59
The Davis v. County of Los Angeles decision indicates the Ninth
Circuit sympathizes with minority groups discriminated against by
employers' use of qualification tests. Nevertheless, the court fails to
compare the language of section 1981 to the Fourteenth Amendment,
or to apply the Washington v. Davis rationale to section 1981. These
failures make the court's use of the Griggs discriminatory impact
standard a decision of questionable validity.
J Michael Benson
56. Croker v. Boeing Co. (Vertol Division), 437 F. Supp. 1138, 1181 (E.D. Pa.
1977).
These concerns do not, however, apply to Title VII. Title VII's requirement of
resort to administrative procedures can operate to eliminate frivolous claims. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-5 (1976); 566 F.2d at 1350 (Wallace, J., dissenting). The fact that
Congress has specifically defined the conduct proscribed by Title VII eliminates any
problems of judicial reluctance to act where Congress has failed to act. Id.
57. E.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (although plaintiffs were able
to prove that defendant's use of an employment qualification test discriminated
against minority applicants, their failure to prove and intent to discriminate left them
without a remedy).
58. Contra Croker v. Boeing Co. (Vertol Division), 437 F. Supp. 1138, 1181 (E.D.
Pa. 1977).
59. For an example of the difficult proof problem in showing discriminatory in-
tent, see Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252
(1977).
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